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SURREPTITIOUS SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE
USA PATRIOT ACT: “THINKING OUTSIDE THE
BOX BUT WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION,”
OR A VIOLATION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS?
Robert M. Duncan Jr.*
We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape, till custom make it
Their perch and not their terror.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Based upon current world events, William Shakespeare’s sev-
enteenth century quote provides an appropriate message for our
country. For the United States’s laws to remain effective in protect-
ing its citizens, these laws, from time to time, must evolve to reflect
the changing nature of society. As Shakespeare alludes to in his
play, Measure for Measure, if laws, especially criminal laws, remain
stagnant they will lose their force. As recent history suggests, if
criminal laws do not change to reflect the times, evildoers can and
will use those laws against the United States. The Patriot Act is an
attempt by the government to change certain criminal laws to bet-
ter protect its citizens.2 However, the debate remains as to whether
the Patriot Act, specifically Title II, § 213, which amends 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103a, and authorizes surreptitious search warrants, is constitu-
tionally justified under the Fourth Amendment, and is within the
mandates of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
or whether the Patriot Act goes too far, and is instead an unwar-
* B.A. in English, Centre College, 2000. J.D., University of Kentucky, 2003. Law
Clerk to the Honorable Henry R. Wilhoit Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge, Eastern Dis-
trict of Kentucky at Ashland. The opinions contained in this article do not necessarily
reflect those of Judge Wilhoit. The author would like to thank Professors Allison Con-
nelly and Sarah Welling for their advice, criticisms, and guidance. The author would
also like to thank his parents, Robert M. and Joanne Duncan, and his fiance´e Valerie
A. Ridder, for their love and support. Finally, this article is in memory of Lucas M.
Woodward, a classmate and friend.
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act 2, Scene 1, Line 1 (Davis Har-
ding ed., Yale University Press 1954) (1926).
2 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
1
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ranted governmental intrusion and invasion of privacy. This article
addresses these concerns.
The United States and the lives of its citizens irrevocably
changed on September 11, 2001. Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack, using
airplanes as weapons of mass destruction, caught the nation off
guard. Simultaneous strikes on the World Trade Center in New
York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. altered our collec-
tive sense of security within our national borders.
In testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
not long after the September 11 attacks, Attorney General John
Ashcroft stated, “we are at war with an enemy that abuses individual
rights as it abuses jet airliners: as weapons with which to kill Ameri-
cans.”3 The terrorist operatives “enjoy the benefits of our free soci-
ety even [though] they commit themselves to our destruction.
They exploit our openness–not randomly or haphazardly–but by
deliberate, premeditated design.”4 The Attorney General also
remarked,
America’s defense–the defense of life and liberty–requires a new
culture of prevention, nurtured by cooperation, built on coordi-
nation and rooted in our Constitutional liberties. . . . Our sur-
vival and success in this long war on terrorism demands that we
continuously adapt and improve our capabilities to protect
Americans from a fanatical, ruthless enemy.5
In quick response to the September 11 attacks, Congress
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act (hereinafter “Patriot Act”) of 2001.6 On Oc-
tober 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the Act into law.
At the signing ceremony, President Bush remarked, the country
took “an essential step in defeating terrorism, while protecting the
constitutional rights of all Americans.”7 The President further
stated, “this law will give intelligence and law enforcement officials
important new tools to fight a present danger. . . . It will help law
enforcement to identify, to dismantle, to disrupt, and to punish
3 DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of John Ash-
croft, Attorney General), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206trans
criptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm (on file with the New York City Law Review).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
7 Press Release, President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill: Remarks by the President at
Signing of the Patriot Act, Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oct. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/20011026-5.html.
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terrorists before they strike.”8
The Act received broad bipartisan support from members of
the House and the Senate. However, some critics described the Act
as a wish list for prosecutors and a “list of horribles” for civil liber-
ties groups like the ACLU.9 Many of the ideas the Patriot Act incor-
porated, including making it easier to obtain wiretaps or search
warrants, were proposed after the 1994 Oklahoma City bombing,
but were not enacted then.10
The Act’s purpose is “[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in
the United States and around the world, [and] to enhance law en-
forcement investigatory tools.”11 The Patriot Act tremendously in-
creases the federal government’s powers in fighting foreign and
domestic terrorism, as well as domestic crime in general. The Act
provides for enhanced surveillance capabilities by law enforce-
ment, including authority for federal criminal agencies, such as the
FBI and CIA, to share criminal investigative information.12 It also
expands the federal government’s surveillance capabilities under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and enacts legis-
lation to deter money laundering by known terrorist
organizations.13
One potentially major enhancement of governmental power
that has not received as much attention as the examples men-
tioned above is found in Title II, Enhanced Surveillance Proce-
dures, § 213. This section, titled “Delay,” authorizes the delaying of
notice of a search warrant execution14 and provides statutory au-
thority for the issuance of surreptitious search warrants.15
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that
a valid search warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached
8 Id.
9 STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 52
(2003).
10 Id. at 52-53.
11 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
12 Ashcroft: Patriot Act Respects Rights, Improves Security, CNN.com/LAW CENTER
(Sept. 11, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/09/11/ashcroft.patriot.act/in
dex.html (“In an interview . . . on the second anniversary of the September 11 terror-
ist attacks, Ashcroft said the Patriot Act ‘took down the wall that used to exist between
the intelligence and law enforcement communities, allowing them to share informa-
tion more easily.’”) (on file with the New York City Law Review); see also The USA
PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, at www.lifeandliberty.gov (last visited Apr. 27,
2004) (on file with the New York City Law Review).
13 See §§ 901-908, USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
14 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b).
15 Unless otherwise specified, the author’s use of the term “government” refers to
the U.S. federal government.
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federal magistrate judge or state judge, and it must be based on
probable cause.16 Rule 41 details the minimum basic requirements
for both conventional and surreptitious search warrants. Surrepti-
tious or covert entries must be based on valid search warrants.
However, as will be discussed more fully, there are basic differences
between conventional and surreptitious search warrants.17 Surrep-
titious search warrants, also known as “sneak-and-peak” search war-
rants, and “covert-entry” search warrants, allow law enforcement
officers to enter a person’s property “while no one else [is] there,
look around, and leave without removing anything.”18 The follow-
ing serves as a brief introduction of the two kinds of search
warrants.
Conventional search warrants allow officers to enter a person’s
home or office, and search for and seize specific items listed in the
warrant.19 The police must provide notice to a target of a search
that they searched her or his premises, and the police must provide
the target with a list of items taken.20 Surreptitious search warrants,
however, require no immediate notice to the target that police
have searched her or his home or office, as long as no items are
seized.21 As will be explored later in this article, notice of the
search can be delayed for many reasons.
Surreptitious search warrants are often used in conjunction
with conventional search warrants. “[A]gents executing surrepti-
tious search warrants often employ them in order to enter a resi-
dence or property when the owner or occupant is not present and
observe the interior of the residence to confirm whatever suspi-
cions the agents might have about illegal activity.”22 According to a
May 21, 2003, report to members of Congress by the Department
of Justice (DOJ), in the approximately eighteen months after the
Patriot Act was enacted, the DOJ sought 248 times to delay having
to notify the target of an investigation that a surreptitious warrant
had been executed.23 It stands to reason that the use of surrepti-
16 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c), (d); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3103 (1948), amended by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103a (2001).
17 These differences will be more fully discussed later in the article.
18 United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir. 1986).
19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
20 Id. at 41(d).
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b).
22 Paul V. Konovalov, Note, On a Quest for Reason: A New Look at Surreptitious Search
Warrants, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 435, 443 (Jan. 1997).
23 Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Lists Use of New Power to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2003, at A1, A15.
The department portrayed its use of its new powers as judicious and
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tious search warrants in conjunction with conventional search war-
rants could increase in the coming years, as more law enforcement
personnel learn of surreptitious searches and their potential
benefits.24
This article explores the history of surreptitious searches, both
pre- and post-Patriot Act and discusses what the future possibly
holds for surreptitious search warrants. The article also explores
several questions, including: are surreptitious searches “working to
protect American lives while preserving American liberties,” as At-
torney General Ashcroft has said, or do they weaken essential
Fourth Amendment protections?25 Is the statutory authorization
for surreptitious search warrants “think[ing] outside the box but
inside the Constitution,”26 as Attorney General Ashcroft has also
said, or does this authorization invade upon people’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in their homes, papers, and effects? Critics
of the Patriot Act generally, and of surreptitious searches specifi-
cally, fear that “the government now operates with an increased
reliance on suspicion, a more frequent use of confidential informa-
tion and a more broadly cast policy of secrecy than before.”27
Other critics, including ACLU Executive Director Anthony Ro-
mero, have stated that the government’s expanded powers are
Orwellian in their scope.28
Changes in the law may be needed, given the United States’
current “war on terror.” This article will explore how surreptitious
search warrants may be a useful arrow in the federal government’s
quiver to fight against global and domestic terrorism. However,
critics correctly assert that the use of these warrants could become
problematic unless firmer guidelines are developed to provide
restrained, but officials are still refusing to divulge certain data publicly
because they say it would compromise classified areas. Civil liberties ad-
vocates said the vagueness in these areas buttressed their concerns
about how the department’s powers were being used. The numbers the
[Justice] [D]epartment provided on several of the most hotly debated
issues appeared relatively low. Id.
24 Shannon McCaffrey, Secret Spy Court Sets Record Issuing Warrants Figure Indicates
U.S. Agents Using Broad New Police Powers, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 3, 2003, at
B6 (“The government sought and received approval for a record number of warrants
. . . a sign that federal agents are putting to use broad new police powers handed to
them after the Sept. 11 attacks.”).
25 DOJ Oversight, supra note 3.
26 Shannon McCaffrey, U.S. Formulating 2nd Patriot Act, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Mar. 26, 2003, at A4, available at 2003 WL 2469611.
27 Tom Brune, Collateral Damage: Government Efforts to Prevent Future Terrorist Attacks
are Putting Civil Liberties at Risk, NEWSDAY, Sept. 15, 2002, at A3.
28 Dimitra Kessenides, Mr. Liberty, JD JUNGLE, Feb./Mar. 2003, at 54, 56.
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stricter notice requirements for covert entries. The article also will
explore the issue of whether § 213 of the Patriot Act should be
used in all domestic crimes.
II. BACKGROUND
To better analyze surreptitious search warrants, the following
review of conventional search warrants and electronic surveillance
law has been included.
A. Brief Discussion of Conventional Search Warrants Under Rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”30
The Amendment further provides, “no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the . . . things to
be seized.”31 The Fourth Amendment does not specifically men-
tion a notice requirement.
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States interpreted the
Fourth Amendment to apply to any government search or seizure
that violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in her or
his person.32 Building upon the foundation developed by the
Fourth Amendment and existing common law, Rule 41 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, titled, “Search and Seizure,” first
enacted in 1944, codified and amended federal criminal law and
practice.33 Section 3103 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code gives statutory
authority to Rule 41.
Rule 41, more specifically subsection (d), lists specific steps
that law enforcement personnel must generally follow to obtain
and execute a conventional search warrant.34 The rule is inter-
preted and reinforced by Supreme Court decisions.35 As required
29 This section is intended to provide a general background on search and seizure
requirements. The author does not intend this section to be considered in any way a
comprehensive analysis of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. The
section is included as a refresher on basic search and seizure principles and to
provide a starting point for a discussion of the differences between conventional and
surreptitious searches.
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31 Id.
32 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s notes.
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by the Constitution, the issuance of a search warrant must be based
on probable cause. To prove probable cause to obtain a warrant,
law enforcement personnel must present a neutral and detached
magistrate or judge with an “affidavit or other information” detail-
ing the law enforcement officer’s belief that probable cause ex-
ists.36 If the magistrate or judge agrees that probable cause exists
for a search, she or he will sign and issue a search warrant.37 In
accordance with Fourth Amendment mandates, “[t]he warrant
must identify the . . . property to be searched, [and] identify any
. . . property to be seized . . . .”38 Law enforcement officers must
execute the warrant within ten days of its issuance.39
When the officer executes the search warrant, she or he must
note the exact date and time of the execution.40 Generally, officers
also must announce their presence before entering the premises to
execute the search warrant.41 Additionally, “an officer present dur-
ing the execution of the warrant must prepare and verify an inven-
tory of any property seized.”42 Officers are restricted to searching
in the areas listed on the warrant, and must look only in places
where the items they are looking for could possibly be concealed.
There is no express provision providing for notice in Rule 41.
However, Rule 41 implicitly provides notice to the target of the
search that a search has taken place. This is accomplished by re-
quiring the officer executing the warrant to “give a copy of the
warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from
whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken,”43 or
“leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the
officer took the property.”44 As will be discussed in depth later in
this article, this notice provision signifies one of the main diver-
gences between surreptitious and conventional search warrants.
There are numerous exceptions to the Rule 41 requirements,
one of which is that law enforcement officers may enter the prem-
ises without announcing their entrance if there is a threat of imme-
36 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1), (d)(1).
37 Id. at 41(e)(3)(D).
38 Id. at 41(e)(2).
39 Id. at 41(e)(2)(A).
40 Id. at 41(f)(1).
41 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (holding there is no blanket excep-
tion for no-knock search warrants). The decision to allow searches without knocking
and announcing must be done on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 394.
42 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2).
43 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (f)(3)(A).
44 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (f)(3)(B).
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diate destruction of evidence.45 Other possible exigent
circumstances, which include danger to officers, hot pursuit, or
people requiring assistance, may also justify entry without an-
nouncement or even entry without a search warrant.46 Addition-
ally, illegal contraband in plain view of the officers may be seized
even if such items are not specifically listed on the search warrant.
For example, if an officer enters a house with a search warrant for a
person’s financial records and papers, and sees a marijuana plant
sitting in the open, the officer may legally seize the plant.47 Prior to
the Patriot Act, common law surreptitious searches were born at
least partly out of the myriad of exceptions to the Rule 41 search
and seizure requirements.48
B. Title III Surveillance
Surreptitious search warrants also borrow heavily from the
procedures of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,49 both in the form of the warrant applications
and substance of the search and surveillance procedures. Title III
regulates “more sophisticated forms of police surveillance, such as
wiretapping and electronic surveillance.”50 Author Paul Konovalov
noted that Title III was Congress’s attempt to regulate police inves-
tigatory techniques after the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz,
which “rejected for the first time the idea that there must be a
physical trespass to trigger the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.”51
The Supreme Court in Dalia v. United States held that the
“Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry per-
formed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bug-
ging equipment.”52 The Dalia Court further stated, “this Court has
45 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963).
46 These examples are meant only to give a sample of the possible exceptions to
the Rule 41 requirements.
47 See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (holding that officers who
lawfully entered a premises had a right to seize an object in plain view); see also Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738-739 (1983) (stating that the theory of the “plain view”
exception is “better understood . . . not as an independent ‘exception’ to the Warrant
Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s
‘access to an object’ may be”).
48 The author recognizes this brief discussion fails to address numerous search
warrant exceptions and nuances, however, in the interest of maintaining the focus of
the article, these issues purposely are not included.
49 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2002).
50 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 464.
51 Id.
52 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979).
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never held that a federal officer may without warrant . . . [break]
into a man’s office or home, . . . and relate at the man’s subsequent
criminal trial what was seen or heard.”53 The Court concluded that
covert entries are constitutional if they are made with a warrant,
and it found “no basis for a constitutional rule proscribing all cov-
ert entries.”54 The Court’s decision in Dalia, that covert entries are
not per se prohibited, has been relied on in subsequent cases au-
thorizing surreptitious search warrants.55
Under Title III, federal officials “may authorize an application
to a federal judge for an order allowing wiretapping or electronic
eavesdropping to discover evidence of specific federal crimes.”56
Before an order is granted, the judge must determine whether the
applicants have tried to use normal investigative procedures.57 Ad-
ditionally, Title III requires that the electronic surveillance “war-
rant not allow the period of interception to be ‘longer than is
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any
event longer than thirty days.’”58 The target of the wiretap or inter-
cept must be given notice “within a reasonable time but not later
than ninety days after . . . the termination of the period of an order
or extensions thereof.”59 As is discussed later, courts should apply
the ninety-day notice requirement by analogy to the surreptitious
search warrant context.
C. Development of Surreptitious Searches, Pre-Patriot Act 60
Surreptitious search warrants are a relatively recent develop-
ment in the legal community, dating back only to the early ’80s.61
During this time, “the FBI and the DEA . . . embarked upon a wide-
spread series of [court-authorized] covert entries in a variety of
criminal investigations,” and by 1984, had persuaded federal
judges and federal magistrates to issue at least 35 surreptitious
53 Id. at 247 (emphasis added). It is important to recognize the premise that all
surreptitious searches and covert entries must be supported by a valid search warrant,
even if that warrant does not provide for notice of the search.
54 Id.
55 See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Simons,
206 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2000).
56 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 465.
57 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2002).
58 United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)).
59 18 U.S.C.  § 2518(8)(d) (2002).
60 Except where noted, the basic definitions and generalities about surreptitious
search warrants apply to both pre- and post-Patriot Act.
61 Kevin Corr, Sneaky But Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peak Search Warrants, 43 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1995).
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search warrants.62 A surreptitious search, also known as a sneak-
and-peak search, or a covert-entry search, “is generally understood
as a search of property without the consent or knowledge of the
owners or occupants of the property.”63 These warrants “allow
agents to conduct searches secretly (whether physically or virtu-
ally), to observe or copy evidence, and to depart the location
searched, generally without taking any tangible evidence or leaving
notice of their presence.”64 Officers executing a surreptitious
search warrant usually take photographs inside the premises
searched.65
As briefly discussed earlier, both conventional and surrepti-
tious searches must be supported by a valid warrant, meaning a
warrant that is issued by a neutral and detached magistrate or
judge upon a showing of probable cause, and that lists and limits
the scope of the search.66 However, surreptitious search warrants
exhibit at least one key difference. Surreptitious search warrants
“do not contemplate a seizure of [tangible] evidence.”67
The basic purposes of surreptitious search warrants are secrecy
and stealth. FBI Supervisory Special Agent Kevin Corr noted in an
article that surreptitious search warrants enable officers to main-
tain secrecy during an investigation, while allowing non-consen-
sual, court-authorized entry and searches.68 Corr further stated
that in a search that does not disturb the premises, an occupant
may not even realize that law enforcement agents have entered un-
til it is too late to curtail the criminal activity.69 Until recently, drug
investigations were the most common instances in which this cov-
ert-entry technique had been employed.70
62 Donald E. Wilkes Jr., Sneak and Peak Warrants and the USA Patriot Act, THE GEOR-
GIA DEFENDER, 1 (Sept. 2002), available at www.law.uga.edu/academics/profiles/
dwilkes_more/37patriot.html
63 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 442-443.
64 ACLU v. United States Dep’t  of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D. D.C. 2003). As
background information in this Freedom of Information Act case, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia discussed changes in the law due to the Patriot Act,
including a discussion of surreptitious search warrants.
65 Wilkes, supra note 62.
66 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 444.; see also, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (b)(1), (d)(1),
(e)(2).
67 Id. at 443. It has been argued that taking pictures constitutes a seizure of evi-
dence; courts have interpreted the no seizure of evidence provision to mean no
seizure of physical evidence. As discussed in Freitas I, taking photographs is consid-
ered seizure of intangible evidence, which is permitted.
68 Corr, supra note 61, at 1103.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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Surreptitious searches hold an obvious allure for law enforce-
ment officials. Before the Patriot Act amendments to Rule 41,
which granted express statutory authority for surreptitious search
warrants, courts sought to develop guidelines for these warrants’
issuance and use, “[b]ecause the sneak and peak technique is liter-
ally sneaky.”71 These limitations reflected courts’ concerns that cov-
ert entry warrants are inherently unfair and violate Fourth
Amendment constitutional protections. Common law rules regard-
ing surreptitious search warrants “developed piecemeal, case by
case and circuit by circuit.”72 The U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia noted, “[b]efore the enactment of the Patriot
Act, a court’s ability to approve a sneak-and-peak warrant . . . was
not entirely settled.”73 As author Konovalov observed before the
Patriot Act was enacted, “[b]ecause the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment reveals little about the constitutionality of surreptitious
search warrants, courts have focused on applying the Unreasonable
Search and Seizure Clause [of the Fourth Amendment] to the sur-
reptitious search context in an attempt to devise standards for the
execution of surreptitious warrants and post-search notice.”74
The same principal issue faces courts today as it did before the
Patriot Act: How much notice must be given to the target of a sur-
reptitious search to constitute reasonable notice? Two circuits, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed this question, pre-Patriot Act. Both circuits re-
lied on different analyses and reached different conclusions re-
garding the notice requirement. Then in 2000, the Fourth Circuit
ruled on a similar case involving a quasi-surreptitious search war-
rant, applying the rule of the Second Circuit.75
When cases involving surreptitious search warrants arise, it ap-
pears likely that the courts will turn to the existing case law of the
Ninth, Second, and Fourth Circuits for guidance in interpreting
surreptitious search questions in the Patriot Act context. There-
fore, before examining the changes the Patriot Act wrought in the
area of surreptitious searches and covert-entry warrants, it is appro-
priate to fully examine the decisions of the seminal cases on the
subject in those three circuits.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1104.
73 ACLU v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
74 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 443-444.
75 United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
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III. THE APPROACHES OF THE NINTH, SECOND, AND FOURTH
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS
A. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(1) United States v. Freitas
United States v. Freitas76 (hereinafter “Freitas I”) is the first re-
ported case involving the use of a surreptitious search warrant.77
Defendants Raymond Freitas and Johnny McClellan were charged
with manufacturing methamphetamine and conspiracy to manu-
facture methamphetamine.78 The police investigation that ulti-
mately led to the charges against them began in late July 1984.79
An anonymous informant called the DEA and notified the agency
that Freitas was running a methamphetamine laboratory in the
basement of his home in Clearlake, California.80 After approxi-
mately five months of dialogue with the anonymous informant and
the DEA’s surveillance and investigation of Freitas, DEA Special
Agent Stephen Wood applied to a magistrate for eight search war-
rants on December 12, 1984.81 The next day, DEA Special Agent
Laura Hayes applied for an additional search warrant–the so-called
“surreptitious entry” warrant–for the defendant’s Clearlake, Cali-
fornia house.82 “Under the terms of the warrant, the agents were
permitted to enter the home while no one else was there, look
around, and leave without removing anything.”83 Special Agent
Hayes justified her request to the magistrate for the surreptitious
search warrant because she believed, “the defendants were in the
middle of what would be an ongoing drug operation and that a
surreptitious entry would help the DEA ‘determine the status of
the suspected clandestine methamphetamine laboratory.’”84 The
magistrate who granted the search warrant used a conventional
warrant form, written to comply with Rule 41, but deleted the
description of the property to be seized, and “the requirement that
copies of the warrant and an inventory of the property taken . . . be
left at the residence.”85 Therefore, the warrant did not contain a
76 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
77 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 444.
78 Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1453.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1452-53.
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notice requirement.86 On December 13, DEA agents executed a
conventional search warrant based on evidence gathered under
the surreptitious search warrant.87 On December 17, a day after the
eight initial conventional search warrants had expired, the govern-
ment applied for an extension (until December 26, 1984). The
magistrate issued the extension, and on December 20, agents
seized various evidence and arrested the defendants at the
Clearlake house.88
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
held a suppression hearing to determine, in part, “whether the sur-
reptitious entry (and the information gleaned from that entry) im-
permissibly tainted the December 17 [conventional] warrant.”89
Although the court stated that surreptitious search warrants are
neither valid nor invalid under Rule 41 or the Fourth Amendment,
the court held that “the agents’ reliance on the surreptitious entry
warrant was objectively unreasonable within the meaning” of the
United States v. Leon 90 good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.91
The Ninth Circuit scrutinized the district court’s decision. It
agreed with the district court’s finding that there was a search as
defined by Rule 41, and that the search’s purpose “was ‘to seize’
intangible, not tangible, property.”92 The intangible property “to
be seized” the court refers to is the “information regarding the sta-
tus of the suspected clandestine methamphetamine laboratory.”93
The court also agreed with the district court that “the search was
authorized by a warrant supported by what the district court con-
cluded was probable cause.”94
The court next turned to the question of “whether a warrant





90 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court held that suppression of
evidence “obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case
basis and only in the unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the
exclusionary rule.” Generally, if a law enforcement officer executing a warrant reason-
ably relies on that warrant, “the marginal . . . benefits produced by suppressing evi-
dence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922.
91 Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1454.
92 Id. at 1455.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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requirement conforms to Rule 41.”95 The court stated that the criti-
cal question pertained to when notice should be given to the de-
fendants.96 The court noted, “although Freitas did not receive
notice contemporaneous with the search, he and other defendants
did receive notice within seven days of the search.”97 However, the
court declined to hold, under the facts of this case, that the war-
rant conformed to the procedures of obtaining and executing a
search warrant under Rule 41(d).98 The court stated, “the adjust-
ments to Rule 41 necessary to regulate surreptitious entries can be
better accomplished by the rule makers and Congress than by the
case-by-case work of courts . . . .”99
The court next examined the district court’s decision under
the Fourth Amendment. In beginning its analysis, the Court of Ap-
peals noted that failing to comply with Rule 41(d) did not automat-
ically require the suppression of evidence.100 If the court
determined that officers executing the warrant did not deliberately
violate a portion of Rule 41(d), and the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, the search could be justified.101
The court stated that the absence of a specific notice require-
ment in the warrant was particularly troubling. “While it is clear
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all surreptitious en-
tries, it is also clear that the absence of any notice requirement in
the warrant casts strong doubt on its constitutional adequacy.”102
The court further stated, “surreptitious searches and seizures of in-
tangibles strike at the very heart of the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment,” and therefore, “surreptitious entries
[should] be closely circumscribed.”103 The court, however, did not
strictly prohibit surreptitious searches. It held that the warrant in
this case was “constitutionally defective in failing to provide explic-
itly for notice within a reasonable, but short, time subsequent to
the surreptitious entry.”104 The court stated that the time for notice
“should not exceed seven days except upon a strong showing of necessity.”105




98 Id. at 1456.
99 Id. at 1455.





105 Id. (emphasis added).
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that on the basis of the actual and assumed facts the agents were
not entitled to assert that their reliance on the warrant was objec-
tively reasonable.”106 The Court of Appeals remanded the case
back to the district court to hold another suppression hearing con-
sistent with the ruling that the DEA agents’ actions in executing
the search warrant were done in good faith. On remand, the dis-
trict court held that the surreptitious entry was illegally author-
ized.107 The district court also had no difficulty concluding that the
surreptitious search of the Clearlake house violated the Fourth
Amendment.108
(2) Subsequent Ninth Circuit Cases After Freitas I
The Ninth Circuit has continued to adhere to the rule of Frei-
tas I in surreptitious search warrant cases. In United States v. Freitas
II (hereinafter “Freitas II”), the Court of Appeals heard the govern-
ment’s second appeal of the results of the suppression hearing
from the district court.109 According to Konovalov, the court “con-
cluded from its independent review of the factual record that there
was a sufficient basis to believe that the agents’ behavior was objec-
tively reasonable in executing the surreptitious search warrant.”110
The court held that the Leon “ ‘good faith’ exception to the exclu-
sionary rule applied, and that the evidence from the searches was
admissible.”111
In United States v. Johns (hereinafter “Johns I”), the government
appealed the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California.112 The district court held that the “sneak-and-
peak” warrant authorizing agents to enter a storage unit and ex-
amine its contents, then leave without disturbing the contents or
notifying the unit’s owner, violated both the Fourth Amendment
and the notice requirement of Rule 41(d).113 The Court of Appeals
stated that the warrant in the present case was indistinguishable
from the warrant in Freitas I, and the district court incorrectly con-
cluded that “the warrant in question did not violate either the
Fourth Amendment or Rule 41(d).”114 Author Konovalov noted,
106 Id. at 1457.
107 United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560, 1570 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
108 Id. at 1571.
109 United States v. Freitas (Freitas II), 856 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1988).
110 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 447-48.
111 Id. at 448.
112 851 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1988).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1135.
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“[s]pecifically, the court observed that the warrant in Johns failed to
provide for any post-search notice, and thus was presumptively vio-
lative of the Fourth Amendment absent a showing that the officers
who executed the warrant acted in good faith in relying on the
warrant.”115 The court remanded the case for further hearings to
determine if Leon applied.
On remand, the district court held that the warrant was relied
on in good faith.116 This brought another appeal to the Court of
Appeals, this time by the defendant. In United States v. Johns II
(hereinafter “Johns II ”), the court, consistent with its holding in
Freitas I, held that a “warrant not providing for notice of a search is
inconsistent with Rule 41(d).”117 The court then explained, “the
failure to give notice in Johns II was a ‘nonfundamental’ violation of
Rule 41 that did not require automatic suppression of the evidence
(as would a ‘fundamental’ or constitutional violation) because the
agents had acted in ‘good faith’ in relying on the warrant.”118 Fi-
nally, the court noted that after its holding in this case, the Freitas I
rule of a seven-day notice requirement would be binding, and law
enforcement would not be able to, in good faith, claim ignorance
of the notice standard.119
(3) Rule of the Ninth Circuit
Based on the analysis of the Ninth Circuit case law, it appears
that the Court of Appeals approves of surreptitious searches in lim-
ited situations, even though before the Patriot Act, surreptitious
searches had no specific statutory authority. The Ninth Circuit
cases indicate that in compliance with Rule 41(d), notice must be
given within a reasonable period of time after the search. The Frei-
tas I decision defines reasonable notice as being up to seven days
after the execution of a surreptitious warrant.120
B. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(1) United States v. Villegas
In United States v. Villegas, eleven defendants appealed their
convictions for cocaine manufacturing and possession and conspir-
115 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 449 (citing United States v. Johns (Johns II), 948 F.2d
599, 604-07 (9th Cir. 1991)).
116 Johns II, 948 F.2d at 600.
117 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 449 (citing Johns II, 948 F.2d at 603).
118 Id. (citing Johns II, 948 F.2d at 606).
119 Id. (citing Johns II, 948 F.2d at 606).
120 United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
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acy to manufacture and distribute cocaine.121 The defendants
raised several arguments in their appeal, chief of which was that
“their [Fourth Amendment] rights were violated by the delay in
receiving notice of the May 13 [surreptitious] search.”122 There-
fore, they argued, the search was not valid, and thus all evidence
seized pursuant to that warrant should be suppressed.
The surreptitious search warrant was granted based on the in-
vestigation of a suspected cocaine manufacturing operation, de-
scribed as being on “a 377-acre dairy farm on Johnnycake Road in
Herkimer County.”123 Defendant Villegas purchased the farm in
1986.124 The DEA began its investigation based on an April 1987
tip by a confidential informant about the “cocaine factory.”125 The
DEA agents performed additional investigation to ensure the verac-
ity of the confidential informant’s statements, and after determin-
ing that the information was reliable, applied for a surreptitious
warrant on May 12, 1987, to search the Johnnycake farm
premises.126
The affidavit accompanying the application for the search war-
rant contained information that the confidential informant had
provided to the agents, as well as “that covert physical surveillance
of the premises was difficult by reason of the farm’s remote loca-
tion, . . . that there was no informant who could infiltrate the oper-
ation, and that numerous coconspirators remained to be
identified.”127 The agents’ affidavit stated that they “did not wish to
seize the evidence believed to be on the premises.”128 Instead, they
wanted authorization to search “in order to ‘take photographs but
not physically to seize any tangible items of evidence at this
time.’”129 Additionally, the agents requested permission to post-
pone giving Villegas notice of the search for seven days, or for even
a longer period.130
The district judge granted the warrant request on May 12,
1987, and the DEA agents executed it on May 13 by entering the
Johnnycake residence that night.131 They did not seize anything,
121 United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1332 (2d Cir. 1990).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1329.
125 Id.
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but they took photographs of various parts of the house and ga-
rage, and their contents.132 The agents did not leave a copy of the
warrant or provide any other type of notice, “and thereafter they
repeatedly sought extensions, eight in all, to allow them to con-
tinue the investigation without alerting the targets.”133 The exten-
sions, each supported by a new affidavit detailing the progress of
the investigation and the need for an extension, “were granted, au-
thorizing delay of service of notice through July 15.”134
Based upon the surreptitious warrant issued on May 12, and
executed May 13, agents obtained a conventional search warrant
on July 14.135 The warrant was executed the same day, resulting in
the arrests of the eleven defendants and the seizure of evidence
related to the possession, making, and distribution of cocaine.136
The defendants were subsequently convicted and received
sentences ranging from ten to twenty-five years in prison.137
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Villegas’ claim
“that the May 12 warrant was unlawful under both [Rule 41] and
the Fourth Amendment . . . because it authorized a search without
a seizure of tangible property and authorized a covert-entry with-
out contemporaneous notice.”138 The court dealt with the defen-
dant’s Rule 41 challenge first.
The court stated, “[g]iven the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirements, and assuming no statutory authority prohibition, the
courts must be deemed to have inherent power to issue a warrant
when the requirements of that Amendment are met.”139 The court
then discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. New
York Telephone Company, a case dealing with a warrant application
for pen registers, giving agents the capability to track the numbers
dialed in the phone’s keypad.140 In New York Telephone Company, the
Supreme Court held, “Rule 41 is not limited to tangible items but
is sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic intru-
sions authorized upon a finding of probable cause.”141 The Second
Circuit held that based on the Supreme Court’s holding in New
York Telephone Company, and other cases, including Freitas I, the





137 Id. at 1329.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 434 U.S. 159, 161 (1977).
141 Id. at 169.
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seizure of intangible items, including pictures, by the DEA was
lawful.
The court next addressed Villegas’ claim that “the July 14 war-
rant should have been suppressed because the May 13 search was
initiated by means of covert entry . . . or because notice of entry
and search was not given to him until after his arrest on July 14.”142
The court began its analysis by stating, “we believe that certain safe-
guards are required where the entry is to be covert and only intan-
gible evidence is to be seized.”143 The court felt strongly that “there
must be some safeguard to minimize the possibility the officers will
exceed the bounds of propriety without detection.”144 Ultimately,
the court concluded that the requisite safeguards were imposed in
this case.145
The court discussed how certain types of searches or surveil-
lances depend on covert entry or “premature absence of disclo-
sure.”146 Citing Katz and Dalia, the court stated, “neither Rule 41
nor the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry.”147 The court
continued by conducting an analysis of the various procedural safe-
guards afforded targets of search warrants under the rules gov-
erning conventional search warrants (primarily Rule 41), and Title
III governing electronic surveillance.148 Based on this analysis, the
Second Circuit developed two limitations on the issuance of war-
rants for covert-entry searches for intangibles.149
The Second Circuit, borrowing from Title III, said, “[f]irst, the
court should not allow the officers to dispense with advance or con-
temporaneous notice of the search unless they have made a show-
ing of reasonable necessity for the delay.”150 The court continued
that although the standard for surreptitious searches would not be
as rigorous as that imposed by Title III, “the officers must at least
satisfy the issuing authority that there is good reason for delay.”151
If a delay is granted by the court, the “court should nonethe-
less require the officers to give the appropriate person notice of





147 Id. (citing Dalia v. U.S., 441 U.S. 238 (1979) for the Fourth Amendment and
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 & n.16 (1979) for Rule 41).




20 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:1
the search within a reasonable time after the covert entry.”152 Rea-
sonable delay is based on “the circumstances of each individual
case.”153 Relying on Freitas I, the court further stated that the issu-
ing court should not authorize a notice delay longer than seven
days.154 However, the court disagreed with Freitas I to the extent
that it decided to allow subsequent “good cause” delays after the
initial seven-day delay expired.155 The Second Circuit in Villegas
held that the applicant requesting the delay could not rely solely
on the grounds for the first delay, but must make a new showing of
the need for further delay.156 The court said, “If these limitations
on the withholding of notice are followed . . . we believe the inter-
ests of both the individual and the government will be adequately
served.”157
(2) United States v. Pangburn
The Second Circuit decided United States v. Pangburn158 three
years after its Villegas decision. The case stems from three search
warrants issued in California to California Bureau of Narcotics
agents working in conjunction with DEA agents from Rochester,
New York.159 Two of the warrants were covert-entry warrants for the
search of a locker owned by Frank J. Salcido for evidence of a large
methamphetamine operation.160 The third was a conventional war-
rant supported by evidence and information garnered under the
two surreptitious searches.161 The two covert-entry warrants did not
authorize the seizure of any tangible items of evidence, nor did the
agents leave notice of their searches.162 Execution of the third war-
rant led to the seizure of materials used to make methampheta-
mine, as well as several firearms: “[t]he items seized, along with
other evidence, formed the basis for a 78 count superceding indict-
ment in the Western District of New York charging Salcido and







157 Id. at 1337-1338.
158 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).
159 Id. at 450.
160 Id. at 450-51.
161 Id. at 451-52.
162 Id. at 450, 451.
163 Id. at 452.
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In a suppression hearing before a federal magistrate, Salcido
challenged the validity of the search warrants.164 The magistrate
judge ordered the evidence suppressed, and the district court ac-
cepted the magistrate’s recommendation.165 The government ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit.
The Pangburn case modifies the Villegas rule, holding that the
seven-day notice requirement “is grounded in [Rule] 41 and is not
compelled by the Constitution.”166 Importantly, the court also
stated, “[n]o provision specifically requiring notice of the execu-
tion of a search warrant is included in the Fourth Amendment.”167
The court said it would not suppress evidence gained under a war-
rant without proper notice, unless there is a showing of intentional
disregard of the notice requirement by the officers or a showing of
prejudice to the defendant.168 As Konovalov states, “[t]hus the
Pangburn court not only rejected the Freitas [I] reasoning that no-
tice is a constitutional requirement, but it also suggested that a war-
rant lacking a notice provision is presumptively valid absent a
showing of intentional disregard for the notice requirement or
prejudice to the owner or resident of the searched property.”169
(3) Rule of the Second Circuit
Since Pangburn is the last reported case from the Circuit, it
appears that its holding is still valid. The court in Pangburn de-
parted from established surreptitious search warrant case prece-
dent and indicated that notice was not required by the Fourth
Amendment.170 The court also held that notice was not required
unless the agents executing the warrant intentionally disregarded
the notice requirement, or there is a showing of prejudice to the
defendant.171 In doing so, the court shifted sharply from Villegas,
and seemingly gave law enforcement greater latitude to use the evi-
dence obtained from surreptitious search warrants.
C. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(1) United States v. Simons
The most recently reported circuit court decision substantively
164 Id. at 452-53.
165 Id. at 453.
166 Id. at 450.
167 Id. at 453.
168 Id. at 450.
169 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 457.
170 U.S. v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1993).
171 Id.
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dealing with surreptitious searches is United States v. Simons.172 In
Simons, the court held that a search team’s failure to leave a copy of
the search warrant behind after searching the defendant’s com-
puter did not render the search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, even though the search violated Rule 41.173
The case arose from Simons’ appeal of the district court’s rul-
ing on his motion to suppress the evidence of pornographic pic-
tures seized from the hard drive of his computer.174 Simons, an
electronic engineer with a division of the CIA, signed an agree-
ment consenting to random “electronic audits” of his computer to
ensure that he was using it strictly for “official business.”175 During
one of these audits, Simons’ supervisors were alerted to the porno-
graphic images, including child pornography, found on Simons’
computer.176 Based on this evidence, Simons’s supervisors con-
tacted the FBI.177 The FBI, in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, worked together in preparing an application for a search
warrant for Simons’ office and computer.178 The affidavit “also ex-
pressed a ‘need’ to conduct the search in secret.”179 The warrant
was issued and executed on August 6, 1998.180 However, “the war-
rant mentioned neither permission for, nor prohibition of, secret
execution.”181 The search team seized several computer files from
Simon’s office by copying them, but did not leave an inventory list
or a copy of the warrant with Simons personally, or at his office.182
In fact, he did not learn of the search until approximately 45 days
later.183
In September, FBI agents applied for, and were granted a sec-
ond search warrant based on evidence seized pursuant to the Au-
gust “surreptitious” search warrant.184 The second search was
executed in Simons’s presence.185 Simons was indicted for posses-
sion of child pornography, and he moved to suppress the evidence
172 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
173 Id. at 403.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 395.
176 Id. at 396.
177 Id.
178 Id.
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gained from the two search warrants.186 The district court denied
his motion, and he was subsequently convicted.187
Simons appealed his conviction alleging violations of his
Fourth Amendment rights.188 The Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the earlier warrantless searches of Simons’ of-
fice, stating that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
computer because of the office policy of random computer au-
dits.189 The court then focused on the August 1998 search
warrant.190
Simons’ principal argument was that the August 1998 search
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41(d) because
the search team did not leave a copy of the warrant or a receipt of
the property taken.191 The court did not specifically classify the Au-
gust 1998 warrant as a surreptitious warrant. The court noted,
“[t]here are two categories of Rule 41 violations: those involving
constitutional violations, and all others.”192 The court continued
that “[n]on-constitutional violations of Rule 41 warrant suppres-
sion only when the defendant is prejudiced by the violation,”193 or
when the defendant proves “intentional and deliberate disregard
of a provision in the Rule” by the government.194
The court concluded that the failure to give Simons notice
“did not render the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.”195 The court also cited Dalia, noting that the Fourth
Amendment does not “proscribe covert entries, which necessarily
involve a delay in notice.”196 The Fourth Circuit finally cited Pang-
burn, holding that because the warrant was issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate, and was based on probable cause, “we per-
ceive no basis for concluding that the 45-day delay in notice ren-
dered the search unconstitutional.”197 However, as in the Second
Circuit in Pangburn, the court then turned its analysis to whether




189 This is an obvious oversimplification of the Court’s reasoning and analysis. How-
ever, for the sake of brevity, and since it does not deal directly with the topic of the
article, further discussion of these issues is omitted.
190 Simons, 206 F.3d at 397.
191 Id. at 402.
192 Id. at 403 (citing United States v. Chaar, 137 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1998)).
193 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 914 F.2d 565, 568 (4th Cir. 1990)).
194 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
195 Id.
196 Id. (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1979)).
197 Id. (citing United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453-55 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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agents.198 Ultimately, the court remanded the case to the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for determination of
this question.
On remand, the district court in United States v. Simons held
there was no evidence that the defendant was prejudiced by the
Rule 41(d) violation.199 In its decision, the court did not refer to
the warrant in the surreptitious warrant context. Instead, the court
analyzed the warrant in terms of a conventional search warrant. It
stated, “the violation occurred after-the-fact: the search was proper
up and until the Government agents exited Defendant’s office
without providing some sort of notice.”200
(2) Rule of the Fourth Circuit
Although the case does not explicitly state this, it appears that
the Fourth Circuit applied the Pangburn rule to the Simons case.
The Simons case was not a traditional surreptitious search case.
However, the court’s treatment of the facts, and the references to
the government affidavits and documents referring to the August
1998 search as “surreptitious” or “covert” seem to indicate that the
court felt that the search was at least quasi-surreptitious. As such,
the court applied parts of conventional Rule 41 analysis to judge
the sufficiency of the warrant itself (i.e., the neutral and detached
magistrate standard, supported by probable cause, etc.), while ap-
plying Pangburn’s logic to the lack of notice provided to Simons
(i.e., no specific notice requirement found in the Fourth Amend-
ment, and if no intentional disregard of Rule 41 or prejudice to
defendant, no suppression of evidence).
IV. SECTION 213 OF THE PATRIOT ACT, AMENDING 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103a: AUTHORITY FOR DELAYING NOTICE OF
THE EXECUTION OF A WARRANT
A. Effect of § 213 Amendments on Rule 41
Patriot Act § 213, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b), “contains
the first express statutory authorization for the issuance of sneak
and peak search warrants in American history.”201 Section 213 is
only a small portion of the immense Patriot Act, and, until re-
cently, has seemingly escaped much media scrutiny. Critics of § 213
contend that § 213 will cause the use of surreptitious search war-
198 Id. at 403.
199 107 F. Supp.2d 703, 705 (E.D.Va. 2000).
200 Id. at 706.
201 Wilkes, supra note 62.
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rants to become the rule rather than the exception in federal
court.202 However, the benefit to law enforcement by the specific
authorization of surreptitious searches is unquestioned. As will be
discussed below, if properly limited, surreptitious search warrants
can be a useful crime-prevention tool.
(1) Congressional Amendment of Rule 41
Section 3103 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides statutory
authorization for the issuance of federal criminal search warrants.
In its text, § 3103 refers users to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Thus, Rule 41, as authorized by Congress,
controls the issuance of federal criminal search warrants. In April
2002, approximately six months after the Patriot Act became law,
Congress amended Rule 41. It added the following language under
Rule 41(a) “Scope and Definitions: This rule does not modify any
statute regulating search or seizure, or the issuance and execution
of a search warrant in special circumstances.”203 This amendment,
which became effective in December 2002, means § 213, and its
authorization of surreptitious search warrants, prevails if it conflicts
with Rule 41.
(2) Congressional Amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3103a
Section 3103a of Title 18 of the U.S. Code supplements Rule
41, and authorizes additional grounds for issuing federal criminal
search warrants. As stated above, if there is any conflict between
Rule 41 and § 3103a (as amended by § 213), § 3103a prevails. Con-
gress originally enacted § 3103a in 1968 and did not amend it until
2001 with § 213 of the Patriot Act.
Section 213 substantially amends § 3103a by adding a “Delay”
provision after the statute’s statement of purpose.204 The “Delay”
202 Id.
203 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(1).
204 USA Patriot Act § 213, 115 Stat. at 285-86 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)).
Section 3103a(a) provides:
(a) In General. - In addition to the grounds for issuing a warrant in
section 3103 of this title, a warrant may be issued to search for and seize
any property that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation
of the laws of the United States.
Section 3103a(b) provides:
(b) Delay - With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order
under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize any
property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in
violation of the laws of the United States, any notice required, or that
may be required, to be given may be delayed if –
(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing im-
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provision in subsection (b) permits the delay of notice if certain
extenuating circumstances or conditions exist.
The statute lists three instances in which it is proper for law
enforcement to delay notice of a search. First, delay may be valid if
“the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immedi-
ate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an ad-
verse result [as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705].”205 “Adverse result” is
defined as “endangering the life or physical safety of an individual,
flight from prosecution, destruction or tampering with evidence,
intimidation of potential witness, or otherwise seriously jeopardiz-
ing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.”206
Next, the amended § 3103a(b)(2)207 states that federal judges
may delay notice if “the warrant prohibits seizure of any tangible
property, any wire or electronic communication, . . . any stored
wire or electronic information, except where the court finds rea-
sonable necessity for the seizure.”208 Finally, subsection (b)(3) of
§ 3101a authorizes delay if “the warrant provides for the giving of
such notice within a reasonable period of its execution, which pe-
riod may thereafter be extended by the court for good cause
shown.”209
(3) What Do the Changes Mean?
The changes to § 3103a give specific statutory authority for
surreptitious search warrants. The drafters of § 213 clearly
modeled the statute after the existing surreptitious search warrant
case law, particularly Villegas. The “reasonable cause” requirement
for delaying notice of the search tracks the “good reason” language
of Villegas (i.e., that the government must provide a good reason
mediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have
an adverse result (as defined in section 2705);
(2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property . . .
except where the court finds reasonable necessity for the
seizure; and
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a rea-
sonable period of its execution, which period may thereafter
be extended by the court for good cause shown.)
205 Id.
206 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Field Guidance on New Authorities (Redacted), Enacted in the
2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b
415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/terrorism1/$file/DOJ_guidance.pdf (last visited Jan.
29, 2004).
207 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).
208 USA Patriot Act § 213, 115 Stat. at 286.
209 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3).
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for delayed notice of warrants).210 However, the statute provides no
definition of “reasonable cause,” or “good cause” to guide judges
who issue search warrants.
Presumably, courts will turn to the Second Circuit’s decision
in Villegas when confronted with the issue of “reasonable cause” for
delay of notice. As previously discussed, the Villegas court held that
the facts of that case provided “ample ground for the initial de-
lay.”211 The court’s additional seven-day extensions of the original
delay based on law enforcement agents’ affidavits updating the
progress of the case, and explaining the need for additional delays,
showed good cause for the further delay.212 As these affidavits pro-
vided a substantial basis for the court to conclude that the further
delay of notice would lead to evidence of wrongdoing, the court
granted the authorization.213
Section 3103a(b)(2) specifically prohibits the seizure of any
tangible physical property. This provision is consistent with both
Freitas I and the Villegas. It is likely that future courts will turn to
these cases for guidance. However, the “reasonable necessity” pro-
vision dealing with the seizure of evidence leaves open the ques-
tion of what constitutes “reasonable necessity.” One might assume
that the “reasonable necessity” of the seizure of evidence would in-
volve situations in which law enforcement personnel find and seize
a bomb, or discover evidence of chemical or biological weapons
while executing a covert-entry search warrant. In a sense, the
seizure would be akin to a plain view seizure. The seizure of these
items would almost certainly be justified.
However, it remains an open question whether officers may
seize an item of evidence based on “reasonable necessity,” and sub-
sequently replace the item with a dummy or a copy. For example,
could law enforcement officers seize a live bomb and replace it
with an identical dummy bomb, so as not to alert the targets about
the surreptitious search? There is no specific prohibition in
§ 3103a(b)(2). The only guidance is the court’s definition of “rea-
sonable necessity for the seizure.”
Finally, § 3103a(b)(3) provides that notice of a surreptitious
search must be given within a “reasonable period” after execution.
Again, the drafters of the statute provide no guidance for the
210 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FIELD GUIDANCE, CRIMES AND OFFENSES–TERRORISM-PA-
TRIOT ACT, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d
6000daa79/terrorism1/$file/DOJ_guidance.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
211 United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1338 (2d Cir. 1990).
212 Id.
213 Id.
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meaning of “reasonable period.” It is safe to assume that courts will
apply the existing case law on surreptitious searches, as well as ap-
ply other reasonable notice provisions by analogy.
Since the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on the
issue, courts are free to apply any one of several competing stan-
dards. Based on the § 213 drafters’ use of Villegas language in the
amendments, a good place to begin the analysis is with the Second
Circuit’s decision. The Second Circuit held that “what constitutes
reasonable time will depend on the circumstances in each case.”214
The Villegas court agreed with the Freitas I decision in that “the issu-
ing court should not authorize a notice delay of longer than seven
days.”215 However, the Second Circuit in Villegas departed from the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis, and held “[f]or good cause, the issuing
court may thereafter extend the period of delay. Such extensions
should not be granted solely on the basis of grounds presented for
the first delay; rather the applicant should be required to make a
fresh showing of the need for further delay.”216 Extensions of de-
laying notice of covert warrants have been delayed by up to two
months and still found valid by courts.217 Courts could also con-
ceivably apply Title III Electronic Surveillance statutes by analogy
to “reasonable period” analysis. Section 2518(8)(d) of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code, covering procedures for intercepting wire, oral, or
electronic communications, provides for a notice delay “within a
reasonable time but not later than ninety days after filing” for an
application for surveillance.218 It appears that this question will be
one of the key issues in the first round of Patriot Act surreptitious
search warrant litigation.
V. ANALYSIS OF AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING
§ 3103a(b) AMENDMENTS
A. Constitutionality of Surreptitious Search Warrants
Federal court decisions leave little doubt that surreptitious
searches and covert entries are constitutionally permitted. The Su-
preme Court’s decision in Dalia that “[t]he Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed [pursuant to a




217 See generally, id.
218 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2002).
219 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979).
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sions by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits further en-
trenched this principle. However, questions of the constitutionality
of the notice provisions persist.
Based on the existing case law, it appears that the delayed no-
tice provisions found in the § 213 Amendments to § 3103a are con-
stitutional. There is no explicit notice provision in the Fourth
Amendment. Professor Wayne LaFave noted that by the early
1800s, “American courts began speaking of the necessity of giving
notice in the execution of a search warrant.”220 He continued,
“[t]his became the generally accepted common law rule in this
country, subject to only limited exceptions,” such as destruction of
evidence or danger to persons.221 As previously noted, federal
courts followed in 1944 with the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
As previously discussed, the language of Rule 41 does specifi-
cally include a notice provision.222 Author Konovalov asserted,
“while notice may be considered as a factor contributing to the rea-
sonableness of a particular search, notice is not constitutionally re-
quired.”223 The recent decision of Simons seems to buttress this
argument. The Fourth Circuit writing in Simons, and quoting the
Supreme Court’s Dalia decision, stated, “[t]he Fourth Amendment
does not mention notice, and the Supreme Court has stated the
Constitution does not categorically proscribe covert entries, which
necessarily involve a delay in notice.”224
The Supreme Court decision in Wilson v. Arkansas,225 further
clouds the area. The Court held that the “knock and announce”
notice principle forms part of the reasonableness inquiry under
the Fourth Amendment.226 However, as Professor Wayne LaFave
noted, “Wilson does not even say that any violation of . . . [a] notice
rule is . . . unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. ”227 He
noted that the “rule is itself not an inflexible rule requiring an-
nouncement [or notice] under all circumstances.”228
Professor LaFave’s concession explains the Supreme Court’s
220 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
598 (3d ed. 1996).
221 Id.
222 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
223 Konovalov, supra note 22, at 461.
224 United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000).
225 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
226 Id. at 929.
227 LAFAVE, supra note 220, at 600-01.
228 Id.
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treatment of Title III electronic surveillance cases. LaFave
continues:
It is not entirely clear whether Title III is somewhat vulnerable
on [the basis of delaying or failing to provide notice contempo-
raneously with electronic surveillance.] However, the lower
courts have consistently rejected constitutional challenges to the
legislation on such grounds. . . . It appears that the Supreme
Court finds these arguments compelling.229
This area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence remains
murky. Even though the framers of the Bill of Rights did not specif-
ically include a notice provision in the Fourth Amendment, it ap-
pears that some type of notice is generally required for the
execution of a criminal search warrant.230 In compliance with this
principle, Rule 41 implicitly, and § 3103a explicitly, provide for
some form of notice to be given to the target of a search. The ques-
tions remain when exactly notice must be given, and how long the
government may delay giving notice.
Until the Supreme Court directly rules on whether the Fourth
Amendment requires a specific type of notice provision, or a defin-
itive standard of exactly when notice must be given, or how long
notice can be delayed, the implied notice provisions in Rule 41 and
the statutorily mandated provisions in § 3103a are presumably con-
stitutional. Thus, it is left to the interpretation and discretion of
the lower courts to determine what constitutes notice and what
procedures provide reasonable notice.
B. Criticisms of § 213 Amendments to § 3103a 231
When asked by an interviewer about the worst aspects of the
Justice Department’s response to the September 11th attacks,
ACLU chairman Anthony Romero responded:
229 WAYNE LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 4.2(c), at 264 (3d
ed. 2000).
230 See ACLU v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24, n.5 (D.D.C. 2003)
(suggesting that “when law enforcement agents seize property pursuant to a warrant,
due process requires them to take reasonable steps to give notice that the property
has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for its return.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
231 This section attempts to state potential criticisms of § 213 amendments to
§ 3103a. The author mixes his personal criticisms with the criticisms of legal
commentators who have spoken on the subject. Surprisingly, there is not a great deal
of criticism specifically about § 213. This may be because other sections of the Patriot
Act, like the Act’s amendments to FISA, have overshadowed § 213’s potential impact.
Because there are only a few specific criticism of § 213, general criticisms of the
Patriot Act, as well as hypotheses about what critics could potentially say about § 213’s
amendments have been applied.
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[T]he new authority [Attorney General Ashcroft] has sought
and secured grants him secret powers, like sneak-and-peak
searches. These are the things that really cut at the heart of a
government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
The more he tries to hide and say, “Trust us, we’re the govern-
ment,” the more we need to be worried.232
Romero’s quote encapsulates the feelings of some Americans who
fear the Justice Department and Attorney General Ashcroft’s Pa-
triot Act legislation expand the government’s powers too greatly.
One concern is that § 213 is not subject to repeal by the Act’s sun-
set provision, unlike other provisions of the act.233 Some commen-
tators fear that unlike other amendments in the Act that are
allowed to expire after their usefulness lapses, § 213 and its amend-
ments to § 3103a will remain, and will be expanded beyond the
scope of its intended use.234
However, probably the area of greatest concern to critics of
§ 213 is the vague language of the amendment to § 3103a itself.
Particularly troubling is the Act’s failure to state a specific defini-
tion of what constitutes reasonable notice. It could be argued that
the “within a reasonable period of execution” language of the
amendment and § 3103a(b)(3) is too broad and amorphous to be
of any practical use. Therefore, without a specific date when lack of
notice becomes unreasonable, courts are likely to misuse the “for
good cause shown” extension for delaying notice, and expand or
extend the amount of time law enforcement officials have until
they must notify the targets of their search. Critics from the Geor-
gia Defender organization assert, “the provision permitting the
court to extend the period (one or more times) ‘for good cause
shown,’ a standard easily met, makes it likely that such extensions
will become routine and pro forma.”235
Additionally, there probably will be much criticism of the “ad-
verse result” requirement of § 213 and § 3103a(b)(1). Critics could
argue 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2)’s definition of “adverse result,” in-
cluding the phrase, “or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investi-
gation or unduly delaying a trial,” is vague and overbroad. A
plausible argument could be made that this language is intention-
ally designed to give law enforcement officials as much flexibility as
possible. The few critics who have spoken on this subject fear “re-
232 Kessenides, supra note 28, at 57.
233 Wilkes, supra note 62.
234 See Editorial, Reject Attempt to Repeal Patriot Act Sunset Clauses, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Apr. 17, 2003, at A15.
235 Wilkes, supra note 62.
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strictions on issuing sneak and peak search warrants border on the
meaningless,” and that the search warrants will be “issued on the
basis of recurring . . . allegations, and that the judicial officials who
issue them tend to be rubber stamps for law enforcement.”236 Re-
cent statements by DOJ officials that the Justice Department has
never been turned down by a court when requesting to delay notifi-
cation buttress the claims of judicial rubber stamps.237
C. Suggestions for Improvement 238
It is undisputed by proponents and critics of the § 213 amend-
ments to § 3103a that these changes are a major enhancement of
federal law enforcement capabilities. The changes allow federal of-
ficials greater ability to fight the War on Terror, as well as to fight
crime in general. The amendments to § 3103a serve a noble pur-
pose. However, § 213 is not without flaws. The § 213 amendments
are vaguely worded and purposefully do not provide any bright
line standards. This undoubtedly was done to give the government
the greatest amount of flexibility in tailoring the application of the
amended law to the largest number of factual situations. There
may be utility for the government using § 213 and its amendments
to § 3103a as currently worded and any bright line standard could
weaken the government’s ability to effectively combat terrorism.
However, adding some definitive guidelines to § 213 would
strengthen its acceptance in the legal community as a legitimate
tool, while not significantly weakening its practical usefulness by
federal law enforcement in fighting certain types of crimes.
First, agents should follow enhanced procedural requirements
when applying for a surreptitious search warrant, as compared to a
conventional search warrant. The changes could be easily adapted
from 18 U.S.C. § 2518, dealing with electronic surveillance war-
rants. Section 2518(1)(c) is particularly applicable to the surrepti-
tious search context and could easily be adapted to fit surreptitious
search warrants. Section 2518(1)(c) requires agents’ warrant appli-
cations to include, “a full and complete statement as to whether or
not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or
why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to
236 Id.
237 Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Lists Use of New Power, supra note 23, at A15.
238 This section identifies ways in which the Act’s amendments could be improved
to make them more acceptable to the public at large, and possibly more widely
recognized as a legitimate law enforcement tool within the legal community.
However, even without the proposed changes, the author feels § 213 amendments are
warranted and will be proven to be beneficial.
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be too dangerous.”239 This change in requirements is appropriate
because surreptitious search warrants, like electronic surveillances,
are considered by some critics to be highly intrusive.240 These are
extraordinary measures and should be treated accordingly. If
adopted, the proposed change would help judges ensure that fed-
eral agents have exhausted every other means of traditional infor-
mation gathering, or investigative techniques, before they issue a
surreptitious search warrant.
Second, there should be a limit on how long officials could
delay notice to the target of a surreptitious search. This change
would be in the spirit of fairness, openness, and disclosure as em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment. Even critics of the § 3103a
amendments recognize the usefulness of surreptitious search war-
rants and their value as investigatory tools.241 However, this change
could potentially influence those who argue that § 213 is inher-
ently unfair.
There is currently a pending bipartisan effort to reform the
Patriot Act generally, and § 213 specifically.242 According to the Na-
tional Law Journal, “[a] number of bills designed to rein in parts of
the act have been introduced in both chambers [of Congress] in
the past year.”243 The broadest of those bills is the so-called Safe
Act (Security and Freedom Ensured Act) of 2004.244 Under the
Safe Act, the current delayed notice provision for surreptitious
search warrants would be altered. Specifically, “[t]he Safe Act
would impose a seven-day, renewable time limit” for delaying no-
tice from sneak-and-peak search warrants.245 This seven-day, renew-
able time limit is similar to the approaches of the Ninth Circuit in
Freitas I and the Second Circuit in Villegas. However, the seven-day
limit, even though it is renewable, is too restrictive.
The best compromise would be to adopt a notice standard
much like 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) governing electronic surveil-
239 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2002).
240 See generally, Konovalov, supra note 22 (arguing convincingly that surreptitious
searches are less intrusive than a regular search).
241 See Dean Schabner, Conservative Backlash: Provisions of “Patriot II” Draft Worry
Those on Right, ABC News, at http://more.abcnews.go.com/section/us/2020/conserv
etives_patriot03012.html (Mar. 12, 2003) (“There’s no question the government has
to have the tools to protect us from terror attacks and to prosecute those who harm
us” (quoting American Conservative Union Executive Director Stephen Thayer)).
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lance, which provides that notice must be given “[w]ithin a reason-
able time but not later than ninety days” after the filing of a request
for electronic surveillance or a wiretap.246 Similarly to
§ 3103a(b)(3), § 2518(8)(d) extensions for delay are based on a
showing of good cause by the government. If the § 2518(8)(d)
standard was adopted in the surreptitious search context, it would
protect the government’s need to conduct covert surveillance of
especially dangerous, or non-traditional criminal entities, while
protecting an individual’s constitutional right to privacy. The
ninety-day time frame seemingly would allow enough time for fed-
eral law enforcement to conduct a thorough investigation.
The standard of “good cause shown” for the extension of de-
laying notice should be strengthened as well. A mere showing of
good cause is not enough. This relatively weak standard gives
credence to critics’ claims that judges are merely rubber stamps for
federal officials. Instead, the law should require federal agents to
present a specific factual basis or show a real need for the
extension.
This was the holding of the Second Circuit in Villegas.247 The
Court of Appeals there required that agents could not rely solely
on the grounds for the first delay, “rather the applicant should be
required to make a fresh showing of the need for further delay.”248
“If these limitations on the withholding of notice are followed . . .
we believe the interests of both the individual and the government
will be adequately served.”249 For example, if a federal agent re-
quests a delay just for more time to observe a target, that would not
be enough. However, if the agent presented the judicial official
with an update on the progress of the investigation, and specific
evidence supporting a legitimate belief that more criminal activity
was going to happen in a relatively short time, that might be
enough to warrant a delay.
Further, the government should limit the number of times an
agent may request an extension. A limit of four, or even two,
ninety-day extensions, totaling either a year or six months, would
be beneficial. These limits would allow the government ample time
to conduct its surreptitious search and continue surveillance of the
target without alerting her or him to the surveillance. Additionally,
these limits would force the government to execute surreptitious
246 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
247 United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 1337-38.
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search warrants only when absolutely necessary, because the target
would have to be notified within a concrete time period, either a
year or six months, of the surreptitious search. The notice could be
made either by the government agency executing the surreptitious
search warrant or by the court that authorized the warrant. This
would further ensure that surreptitious search warrants would only
be used in the middle of, or at the end of, an on-going investiga-
tion. If not, agents using surreptitious search warrants at the begin-
ning of an investigation would risk “blowing their cover” and risk
the investigation’s secrecy if the target was notified by the court of
the surreptitious search before agents completed the investigation.
Even with the proposed changes, critics could still argue that
the “good cause shown” standard is relatively weak. However, as
was the case in the Villegas decision, at least the changes would de-
lineate specific procedures for courts to follow in granting
extensions.
Finally, § 213 and § 3103a should be amended to specifically
limit surreptitious search warrants to certain types of crimes. The
Patriot Act in its general statement of purpose reads, “An Act to
deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the
world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for
other purposes.”250 The § 213 amendments do not limit surrepti-
tious searches in any way. Instead, they are applicable to any type of
crime.251 Congress needs to limit the overly broad scope of the
§ 213 amendments to § 3103a to ensure that they are not misused.
Surreptitious search warrants should be limited to specific
crimes, involving well-planned, well organized, and in-depth crimi-
nal behavior. This would include offenses such as terrorism, as well
as racketeering, and gang-related activity. Surreptitious search war-
rants should only be used against certain types of criminals, such as
terrorists and major drug dealers. Additional examples could also
include members of well organized criminal entities or criminal
syndicates.252 This change would help justify the use of surrepti-
tious searches to the public, and to make individuals feel more se-
cure in that the government is not overstepping its boundaries.
250 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
251 See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs to Swindling,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at A1 (stating the government “has begun using the law
with increasing frequency in many criminal investigations that have little or no con-
nection to terrorism.”).
252 The author lists these examples only as references. The statute could be tailored
more expansively to include more crimes, or narrowly to only apply to terrorism. The
example of drug dealers and terrorists will be used throughout.
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Although not unconstitutional, this breadth of applicability of
surreptitious searches is arguably not within the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment. Certainly, we live in a different world than when the
Founding Fathers drafted the Bill of Rights. There is little possibil-
ity that they could have conceived the level of technological en-
hancement that the United States has attained over the past 200-
plus years. Similarly, there is little chance they could have
imagined terrorists, instead of conventional armies, attacking the
United States, let alone terrorists potentially using weapons of mass
destruction. There is also little way they could have envisioned the
drug epidemic that plagues our nation.
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights provide a framework
within which our nation’s laws grow. Therefore, it can be argued
that it is appropriate and constitutionally justified to update our
laws to use surreptitious search warrants to combat terrorism both
at home and abroad. The government is also justified in using sur-
reptitious search warrants to combat major drug dealers.253 As
noted by the Freitas and Villegas courts, the use of surreptitious
search warrants stems from the federal government fighting “big-
time” drug dealers.
However, the government’s use of surreptitious search war-
rants outside of extraordinary circumstances, such as fighting the
war on terrorism or the war on drugs, arguably violates the spirit of
the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment affords people
“[t]he right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects.”254 To allow the government to use surreptitious search war-
rants against average citizens, even if they are engaged in criminal
activity, gives credence to one critic’s contention that the use of
surreptitious search warrants is Orwellian in its scope.255
The sanctity of one’s home is a fundamental freedom, in-
grained in the American consciousness since the country’s found-
ing. To allow the government to invade a person’s home while he
or she is not there, even if that person is a criminal, and look
around, leaving no notice of the search, seems inherently unfair.
Surreptitious search warrants used against individuals, even sus-
pected criminals, with no ties to terrorism, gangs, major drug activ-
ity, or well organized criminal organizations, gives one the feeling
253 Major drug dealers, traffickers, or producers could be defined by existing stat-
utes relating to quantity of drugs produced/sold/possessed or could be written to
specifically apply to the proposed changes to the § 213 amendments.
254 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
255 Kessenides, supra note 28, at 56.
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that the government is marshalling all its resources against one
person, resembling “J. Edgar Hoover’s ‘black bag jobs.’”256 To al-
low the government to run roughshod over this right, without
good reason, is contrary to the principles upon which our country
was founded. However, in certain circumstances, the government is
well within its rights to execute surreptitious search warrants.
By limiting the scope of the government’s use of surreptitious
search warrants to those situations when the government can prove
to a neutral judicial officer that it has credible and specific evi-
dence that the target of a potential surreptitious search is engaged
in terrorist activity against the United States, or is engaged in a
major drug producing, selling, or trafficking operation, or is in-
volved in well organized criminal activity, makes the § 213 amend-
ments to § 3103a more fair and palatable. This proposed change
would still allow federal officials to level the playing field against
those, like terrorists and major drug producers/traffickers, and
others, who “exploit” our country’s “openness” and “free society
even [though] they commit themselves to our destruction,” while
easing the fears of citizens and ensuring that the government does
not overstep its boundaries.257
VI. CONCLUSION
For the United States to continue to grow and prosper, the
country’s criminal laws must be changed and adapted with the
times, lest they lose their force. Section 213 of the Patriot Act, au-
thorizing surreptitious search warrants for federal crimes, is one of
the government’s post-September 11 attempts at updating the ex-
isting laws to better protect its citizens. The § 213 amendments to
18 U.S.C. § 3103a are a welcome and needed change. However, the
amendments to § 3103a need clarifying, particularly in the context
of what constitutes reasonable notice under § 3103a. Further, Con-
gress needs to limit the situations and the types of crimes that the
government can use surreptitious search warrants. These changes
to the § 3103a amendments would help satisfy critics who assert the
amendments go too far and violate fundamental fairness. While
limiting the applicability of surreptitious search warrants, the pro-
posed changes would not dramatically limit the government’s abil-
ity to achieve its stated objective of fighting terrorism.
256 Nat Hentoff, The FBI’s Magic Lantern: Ashcroft Can Be in Your Computer, VILLAGE
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With the proposed changes, the benefits of the § 213 amend-
ments to § 3103a outweigh the risk of harm to civil liberties associ-
ated with the amendments. The Act’s § 213 amendments give the
government another arrow in its quiver to shoot down “the birds of
prey” that intend to harm the United States, and seek to make our
country’s criminal laws “[t]heir perch, and not their terror.”258
“There is a significant civil-liberties price to be paid as we
adopt various national-security initiatives,” stated former U.S. Attor-
ney Mary Jo White in an interview.259 Even though the § 3103a
amendments are needed to bring “this nation’s surveillance laws
into the twenty-first century,” and are justified given the current
War on Terror, the amendments are not perfect.260 By fine-tuning
the § 3103a amendments and adding more procedural safeguards,
including stricter notice requirements, and limiting the amend-
ments’ applicability to specific crimes and criminals, we can lessen
the civil liberties price that must be paid to live in our current
world. A balance can be struck between the government’s legiti-
mate interest in protecting its citizens, and citizens’ reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy in their homes.
258 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1.
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